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MODERN DISCOVERY: REMARKS FROM
THE DEFENSE BAR
NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH*
The curbing of discovery abuse is an issue of general concern
for all those who take an interest in the evolution of our legal pro-
cess. It is of particular interest for me, however, as General Coun-
sel of International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), the
most discovered company in America. My views have been influ-
enced, in some measure, by having borne witness to the surprising
number of lawyers that have poured through the records of Tom
Watson,1 scrutinizing his activities for the Boys Scouts of America,
in hope of finding some smoking gun in those files. Thus, although
my personal sentiment is strong, I would like to start with a less
particularized discussion of the topic at hand.
It seems evident that litigation has become so expensive as to
make it quite an unsatisfactory method of resolving disputes.2 Dis-
covery and the rules of discovery have a great deal to do with this.
Although additional sanctions against attorneys will have some
ameliorative impact on discovery abuse,3 it is doubtful that these
sanctions are in any sense a solution to modern discovery
problems.
Adequate legal authority for necessary sanctions against coun-
sel or against the party are available under the current law.4 The
* B.A., Princeton University, 1945; LL.B., Yale University, 1947. The author presently
is General Counsel to International Business Machines Corporation.
, Thomas J. Watson Jr. was Chairman of the Board of Directors of IBM from May
1961 to June 1971.
2 See Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 217, 234; Kirkham, Complex
Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 203 (1976) ("[t]o put it
bluntly, the courts and the profession have slept while the processes we employ to achieve
substantive determinations have swallowed up the capacity to make such determinations").
3 U.S. JUD. CONF., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CivIr. PROcEDURE
(1982) Rule 26(g) advisory committee note adopting as amended COMM. ON RULEs OF PRAC.
AND PRoc., U.S. JUD. CONF., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FED-
EFAL RuLEs OF CIVII, PROCEDURE (1981), reported in Nat'l L.J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 13, col. 3,
and N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
4 See J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338, 351-60 (D. Conn. 1981);
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1981); FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally Renfrew, Discovery
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presence of these sanctions, however, diverts attention from the
conduct of the attorney in the case. 5 It is the job of the attorney to
be more efficient6 and effective in conducting discovery. The prob-
lem of abusive discovery is likely to be much more a problem of
the individual incompetence and ineptitude of the lawyers in-
volved than it is of any grander conspiracy. Quite simply, it seems
that they are not as conscientiously prepared7 as they should be
and we all should face up to that problem. Several illustrations of
this from IBM's own litigation history readily come to mind.
For example, Frank Cary, who was the Chief Executive Officer
of IBM, was deposed by the private plaintiffs and the Government
in the action for a total of 45 days. In one of the last depositions,
which was 11 years into the case, and 2 or 3 years after the Gov-
ernment rested, the questions asked clearly indicated that the at-
torneys involved had never read any of the earlier depositions. A
random sampling proves the point: "Where is the corporate office
of IBM?"; "Would you provide please the present address of each
corporate staff officer?"; "What are IBM's two world trade groups
called?"; "Are any computer systems manufactured by the data
systems division?"; "Who is the head of the general products divi-
sion?"; "What is the approximate size and square feet of the facil-
ity at Poughkeepsie?"; "What is the approximate size and square
feet of the data plant?"; "What is the Federal Systems Division?";
"Does the chief executive play any role in planning?"; "When did
Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 264, 267-71 (1979); Note, Sanctions
Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 619,
640 (1977).
' See Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. the Quality of Justice: More is Less, 4
LMGATION 8, 8 (Fall 1977); Renfrew, supra note 4, at 281. Additional sanctions "will not
curb excesses unless the bar's attitude toward discovery shifts from indulgence to self-re-
straint." Liman, supra, at 8. The recent shift in judicial emphasis in favor of using sanctions
as a deterrent to future abuse may help achieve such a change of attitude. See generally
Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91
HARv. L. R.v. 1033, 1044-54 (1978).
6 See Brazil, supra note 2, at 230. In a study conducted by Professor Brazil, the inter-
viewed attorneys subscribed to the theory that in larger cases inefficiency was the dominant
characteristic. Id. In addition, Professor Brazil identified the "inertia of style" phenomenon,
which explains the tendency of lawyers to develop a "pattern" of discovery techniques. The
pattern may not be appropriate in one particular situation, but nonetheless it is followed
with the "rigidity" of a "habit." Id. at 238-43.
7 See id. at 237. Overdiscovery may be caused by "failure to study or to understand
information that is available from one's own client or that has been produced by others." Id.
Interrogatories, for example, often contain questions which are clearly inapplicable. Flegal &
Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 597, 605.
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you become chairman?".
This example is keenly illustrative of the fact that depositions
have become an unexamined way of life. My father was a trial law-
yer, and it seems unfortunate that the heirs to his craft will come
to be characterized as deposition lawyers. The reason for this is
that unlike a trial, the inartful or dilatory deposition is without
substantial effect. This trivialization, combined with the fact that
money can be made in the bargain, has created a climate of enor-
mous inefficiency. 8
It is important to note, however, that in many cases there are
no such problems." For a judge to involve himself in the discovery
process when his involvement has not been requested by the law-
yers handling the case therefore would be a mistake. 10 There is an
important factor militating against the position that judges should
get involved regardless of whether they are needed. If either lawyer
wants a judge involved in the case, however, judicial participation
should be forthcoming. It appears that the real problems occur in
cases in which the claims themselves are incredibly broad, such as
those ordinarily found in antitrust, securities and environmental
law.1" These cases are complex precisely because they are un-
focused, and they are unfocused because the law is very general
and uncertain.2 Everything therefore becomes discoverable and
8 See Renfrew, supra note 4, at 278-79.
9 Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed
Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REv. 253, 255 (1979). The Special Committee for
the Study of Discovery Abuse of the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation pos-
ited, "abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to require
basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases." Umin, Discovery Reform: A
New Era or Business as Usual?, 65 A.B.A. J. 1050, 1050 (1979). Professor Brazil identified
two "subworlds" of litigation cases: the small, relatively routine and simple case, and the
large, complex case. Brazil, supra note 2, at 218. In the small case, except for scheduling
difficulties and delay, discovery is not seen as a "problem" since it consumes less time and
resources than in larger cases. Id. at 223. As a case becomes more complex, however, the
tendency is to exhibit more of the characteristics which typify the "discovery abuse syn-
drome." Id. at 229-30.
10 Cohn, supra note 9, at 254; Flegal & Umin, supra note 7, at 603. Generally, a judge
will not become involved in the discovery process unless there is a "problem." Cohn, supra
note 9, at 254-55; Flegal & Umin, supra note 7, at 603. This is due In part to "judicial faith
in the zeal of lawyers" to seek aid when it is needed. Renfrew, supra note 4, at 272.
11 See Kirkham, supra note 2, at 202; American College of Trial Lawyers, Recommen-
dations on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 215 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Complex Litigation].
" McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARv. L.
R-v. 27, 27 (1950) ("[t]he offense established by the Sherman Act has never been sharply
defined"); see Kirkham, supra note 2, at 202. In the typical large antitrust suit, the com-
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the parameters of discovery are greatly expanded. A second orien-
tation fueling increased discovery is the sense that one must get all
the facts that one can in order to figure out some theory of
recovery.13
The same principles can be applied to the defendant in a law-
suit. The precise problem arises when a claim of damages against
the defendant is for a very large amount of money. In this situa-
tion, the only defense strategy is to scrutinize every possible busi-
ness problem of the plaintiff that might have accounted for those
damages. It appears almost mandatory, from my personal experi-
ence, that the defendant enlarge the scope of discovery so as to
mitigate his damages.
Another factor which encourages abusive discovery is the
sheer volume of discoverable items.14 When the rules were promul-
gated in the 1930's, my father had access to neither daily tran-
scripts nor computer printouts. Such deprivation not only made
things a great deal more efficient, but also assured the safety of
plaint states "little more than that defendants have conspired to restrain trade. Explosive
advocacy immediately takes over and discovery knows no bounds." Kirkham, supra note 2,
at 203; accord McKinstry, Civil Discovery Reform, 14 FORUM 790, 793-97 (1979). In one
large securities case, 150,000 pages of deposition and transcript testimony were prepared, In
re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977), and a set of interroga-
tories 381 pages long was served, In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 74 F.R.D. 497, 497
(S.D. Cal. 1975). For an interesting procedure used to avoid "fishing expeditions," see Dur-
ham & Dibble, Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust
Litigation, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rlv. 299, 299-300.
13 See Kirkham, supra note 2, at 204. Often, complaints will be filed "to gain access to
discovery, which [the parties] use, not to find evidence to support their claim, but to dis-
cover whether they have any claim at all." Renfrew, supra note 4, at 266 (footnote omitted).
If there is a good-faith belief that an actual claim exists, there is no justification for refusing
this opportunity to vindicate the party's rights. See id. Frequently, however, "neither the
client nor the attorney has any reason to believe in good faith that a claim exists, but hopes
that something may turn up in discovery that would support a claim." Id. at 266-67; see also
Brazil, supra note 2, at 236 (overdiscovery is "easier than thinking" and is often a result of
the failure to develop clear theories of liability). But cf. Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F.
Supp. 592, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Sherman Act claim dismissed, district court noting, "[t]he
courts of appeals have been conscious of the danger present in general allegations of anti-
trust violations").
14 See FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(1) ("[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action"). In
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Supreme Court stated that the discovery rules
are to be accorded "broad and liberal treatment." Id. at 507. This statement has spawned an
extremely lenient judicial approach as to what is "discoverable." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 354 (1970). When, however, discovery results in "mil-
lions of papers, . . . we should ... consider whether noble experiments have gone awry."
Kirkham, supra note 2, at 202.
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America's forests for future generations. Not only is the modern
attorney entitled to get much more information, but there is a
great deal more information to be obtained.
Concededly, it is doubtful that narrowing discovery is very
likely to make good lawyers out of bad ones or even make good
judges out of bad ones. Narrowing discovery, however, does serve
some purpose. Thus, although the rules read as though one is enti-
tled to discovery as a matter of right, this entitlement terminates
when a judge takes control and begins to marshal rules which re-
strict one's access to information. As long as the judge is reasona-
ble and fair and displays a critical sensibility, an attorney's ability
to argue that he is entitled to some information as a matter of
right when he is unable to give valid reasons for such access will be
severely curtailed.
In the antitrust, securities and environmental law areas no dis-
covery should be permitted until the parties have produced a
statement of issues from both points of view and any factual stipu-
lations. In a case of this sort, the judge should encourage the par-
ties to act expeditiously on this clarification by making it nonbind-
ing and permitting amendments. Specific criteria must be
developed against which the judge can assess the discovery that
the party wishes to undertake. 15 It seems that, typically, in com-
plex cases the facts are not in dispute. It is almost always the in-
ferences that people draw from the facts which create differences
of opinion. Thus, it appears feasible that one could indeed stipu-
late much of the bare bones facts.
I have two final suggestions. One is a typical defendant's sug-
gestion: expanding a judge's discretion to actual costs, including
attorney's fees.1" Adoption of the English rule17 would operate, not
13 See generally Complex Litigation, supra note 11, at 212-26. Judges are generally
unequipped to handle the massive amounts of paper involved in complex litigation. As a
result, the courts tend to allow plaintiffs to examine anything they request, whether it is
relevant or not. Kirkham, supra note 2, at 203. Therefore, many commentators have ex-
pressed the need for "discovery management" by the court. See McKinstry, supra note 12,
at 797-98 ("[in complex litigation it is considered essential for the court to take charge of
discovery at the beginning, require the issues to be specified and limit discovery to the spe-
cific issues").
"6 See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 792, 794 (1966).
17 In England, the courts have the authority to award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party and, in practice, often do so. See Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith
Exception, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 319, 320 (1977). The "American rule," which states that attor-
ney's fees are not recoverable, is the general practice in the United States. Alyeska Pipeline
[Vol. 57:732
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so much as a sanction, but as a means of making attorneys aware
of the fact that somebody has to pay those bills and it is not al-
ways the other fellow. I am inclined to think this is a defendant's
position because the plaintiffs, who most of the time can recover
their actual attorney's fees,"' by and large already think in these
terms.
The other suggestion is a simple one dealing with contingency
fees. Although I believe in contingency fees, they are unnecessary
to the extent that attorneys receive a multi-million dollar stake in
the case. A rule that would serve to correct this situation could
provide that contingencies are available at whatever percentage
one bargains for, but it may not exceed a reasonable multiple of
the normal hourly rate.
In short, it seems to me that the foundation for improving the
discovery process is a change in the attitudes19 and the financial
expectations of the lawyers involved. Sanctions may not be the ul-
timate concern. I think it is very difficult for a judge really to con-
trol the discovery process. I do not think they like to, and I think
the rules accord them a convenient excuse not to do so. I would
suggest, however, that one cannot impose sanctions without doing
all of that work, and therefore it seems more appropriate to man-
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Proponents of the "American rule"
argue that an award of attorney's fees is a penalty for prosecuting or defending a lawsuit
and as such is an unfair price to pay simply for losing. Note, supra, at 320-21. Those who
support the English system emphasize that the "American rule" is unfair to the successful
party who "is never fully compensated." Id. at 321. There are, however, important excep-
tions to the "American rule," both statutory, such as section 1927 of title 28, see 28 U.S.C. §
1927 (Supp. V 1981), and through the "bad faith exception" in federal courts, see id. at 323.
For a discussion of the history of the "American rule," see Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at
247-71.
Is See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981) (attorney's fees available to a prevailing
plaintiff in antitrust suit); id. § 77k(e) (1976) (Securities Act of 1933); id. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a)
(Securities Act of 1934); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1976) (Clean Air Act § 304(d)); id. § 2000a-
3(b) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); id. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
19 Judge Renfrew aptly states that "[t]he civil justice system in the United States de-
pends on the willingness of both litigants and lawyers to try in good faith to comply with
the rules established for" the fair and efficient administration of justice." Renfrew, supra
note 4, at 264. Consequently, "if litigation is to remain a viable means of resolving contro-
versies, the trial bar must change its habits. Discovery cannot be a reflex action." Liman,
supra note 5, at 9. The emphasis in discovery must shift from a "why not?" attitude to one
which concentrates on what needs to be discovered. Moreover, methods used prior to the
passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be rediscovered, such as interviewing
as a less costly alternative to taking depositions. See id.
738 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:732
age a trial, manage discovery and the pretrial process than it is to
determine what sanctions to impose and when.
